The burgeoning technology of Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is attracting the traditional Location-Based Service (LBS) and Location Service (LS) to deploy due to its nature characters such as low latency and location awareness. Although this transplant will avoid the location privacy threat from the central cloud provider, there still exist the privacy concerns in the LS of MEC scenario. Location privacy threat arises during the procedure of the fingerprint localization, and the previous studies on location privacy are ineffective because of the different threat model and information semantic. To address the location privacy in MEC environment, we designed LoPEC, a novel and effective scheme for protecting location privacy for the MEC devices. By the proper model of the Radio Access Network (RAN) access points, we proposed the noise-addition method for the fingerprint data, and successfully induce the attacker from recognizing the real location. Our evaluation proves that LoPEC effectively prevents the attacker from obtaining the user's location precisely in both single-point and trajectory scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is a new technology which is currently being standardized in an ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) of the same name. Mobile Edge Computing provides an IT service environment and cloud-computing capabilities at the edge of the mobile network, within the Radio Access Network (RAN) and near mobile subscribers. The aim is to reduce latency, ensure highly efficient network operation and service delivery, and offer an improved user experience. The growth of mobile traffic and pressure on costs are driving a need to implement several changes in order to maintain the quality of experience, the Internet of Things (IoT) is further congesting the network and network operators need to do the local analysis to ease security and backhaul impacts [1] .
Among all of the pervasive mobile and cloud-based services, the location-based service (LBS) and the location service (LS) are the most suitable services for the decentralized deployment of the MEC scenario. However, from the view of privacy preservation, in MEC scenario, the concern on the location privacy still exists. Although the location is avoided from being sent to the centralized cloud, the different threat model in MEC scenario is, to some extent, threatening the location privacy. As shown in Fig. 1 , two main factors are involved in the MEC scenario. First, in the traditional threat model of centralized LBS service, the privacy concerns are originated from the geolocation information. However, in the MEC scenario, such a threat model is inapplicable, since the location awareness MEC is capable of generating location from the wireless signal space "fingerprint". In MEC scenario, the fingerprint of user needs to be protected. Second, the basis of the MEC infrastructure is constructed by the edge smart devices with limited computational power and with well-known lacking of security. As a result, privacy concerns due to the weak security of infrastructure is still severe.
In this paper, we investigated the location privacy preservation in MEC scenario and proposed a noise addition-based scheme named LoPEC to protect the fingerprint information of the user. Specifically, we introduce the fundamental topology model of the MEC wireless infrastructures, based on this model, and we designed a method to generate the "noise fingerprint". Then, the noise addition scheme was given to protect the fingerprint of the user. We consider the trajectory privacy and propose an enhanced algorithm, which can further generate trajectory-like noise fingerprints when using continuous location updates.
The evaluation we implemented on Android device verified the effectiveness while maintaining a reasonable time cost for 978-1-5386-8088-9/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE today's devices. This paper makes the following main contributions.
(1) We propose a method for adding noise that can confuse the potential attackers and prevent it from recognizing the user's location in the MEC scenario. The protection level can be adjusted according to the degree of the threat. With our method, the noise fingerprint does not reduce the usability of the real location and has no impact on the LBS functionality.
(2) We use a light-weight and realistic system architecture for the MEC environment. No unrealistic assumption or multiparty cooperation is needed. Our scheme can be realized directly in modern smart devices and the mobile internet ecosystem.
(3) We consider both single-spot positioning privacy and trajectory privacy and ensures, through the use of the noise fingerprint, that the attacker will generate trajectory-like locations that are not easy to decipher by committing a homogeneity attack [2] .
(4) LoPEC provides an optimization algorithm based on the raw noise-generating method and drastically reduces the computational costs. This feature is meaningful because energy use is an essential concern with mobile devices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the related work. Section III outlines the preliminaries of LoPEC. We describe the design details of LoPEC in Section IV. Section V and Section VI provide theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Approaches on location privacy can be divided into two categories: LBS scenarios and LS scenarios.
A. Approaches to the LBS scenario (how to use safely)
Much attention has been paid to this location privacy scenario in the past decade. Most approaches to this scenario were surveyed comprehensively in [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] .
The threat models of these approaches are more or less similar. They prefer treating the LBS providers as the most untrusted adversaries with extensive background knowledge. Based on this framework, their primary purpose is to prevent the LBS providers from knowing the user's accurate locations while at the same time retaining the LBS functionality and service quality as much as possible.
Many ingenious methods have been adopted successfully in these approaches, such as dummy adding, k-anonymity, obfuscation, region cloaking, caching and encryption-based methods. Although they have different ideologies and realization details, these approaches such like [7] [8] [9] [10] share the same understanding of the scenario boundary; they do not care how a location is obtained. The mobile user first obtains a known and definite location, and then their approaches are applied.
In LBS data publication scenario, the off-line location privacy can be preserved by the time-consuming data preservation schemes [11] [12] [13] . However, they can not be performed in the real-time LBS scenario restricted by there cost. Several privacy threat detecting methods such as [14] [15] [16] are also being used on location privacy in LBS scenario. In MEC scenario, the LS providers (LP), who are as untrustworthy as the LBS providers, suffer from the same privacy threat concerns. The location privacy needs to be protected even before the location is generated. However, these approaches can neither protect location privacy against the LP because their threat model is incomplete nor be applied to the MEC scenario directly because the communication contents, as well as the semantics, are different.
B. Approaches to the MEC scenario (how to obtain safely)
Compared to the LBS scenario, the situation in which the device requests the location from an LP is entirely different. Several researchers have studied the problem in this scenario from different perspectives.
Damiani and Cuijpers described this privacy issue in [17] and tried to solve this problem by designing a policy control mechanism to adjust the granularity of the location determined by the LP. This approach is not a computational technique but rather a policy suggestion.
Tipp. in [18] described a location privacy threat called a location spoofing attack, in which the attackers can counterfeit the devices original fingerprint information and imitate the real user to request the user's location from the LP. Then, the method proposes a reliability determination algorithm to cope with this threat. However, their threat model regarded the LP as trusted, which is unrealistic in the MEC scenario.
Some encryption-based method such as [19] is also proposed to protect location privacy against the LP. However, the encryption procedure is too time-consuming for the lightweight edge devices.
Tian in [20] and [21] proposed a privacy concerned nearest neighbor query method for the LS in order to enable the LP to provide such kind of query service for the user, by avoiding the use of location information, the location privacy is preserved.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the assumptions on the system adopted in this paper using some basic concepts and then present the motivation for and the basic idea of our solution.
A. System assumptions
Our threat model is concise. We concentrate our research on the LS procedure in the MEC scenario, and we do not consider the location privacy problems of the LBS scenario. We do not assume what LS providers may adopt specific technology because our scheme is designed based on the fundamental principles of the vast majority of those technologies.
We treat the RAN access points (APs) as the only communication infrastructure adopted by the LP. This assumption is rational because state-of-the-art technologies mainly rely on the RAN APs (e.g., Wifi hotspots) to achieve meter-level positioning accuracy. 
B. Limitations
Our goal is for our scheme to possess strong suitability for today's positioning technologies rather than apply to one specific positioning technology; we also want it to be realistic. This goal imposes the following limitations:
1. LoPEC cannot rely on the technical details of any positioning technology; and 2. LoPEC cannot perform any modification of existing positioning technologies.
To accommodate these limitations, we implement LoPEC on the device side. The user's job during the positioning process remains almost the same: sense the APs in proximity and transmit them to the LP (Fig.2(a) ).
Further, the concept of noise addition is much more difficult to realize in the MEC scenario for the following two reasons:
1. The noise fingerprint we need in the MEC scenario, i.e., the AP identifiers(Wi-Fi Mac addresses in this paper), must not only be homogeneous to real fingerprint but also should be understandable to the LP. As shown in Fig.2(b) .
2. Even using real-world AP identifiers that can be handled by the LPs as our noise fingerprint, there is still an additional problem to be solved; Fig.2 (c) illustrates this problem.
C. Basic idea
For the first problem, we will enable the user to possess a vast number of real-world AP identifiers as the candidate set of noise fingerprint. For practicability, we will assume a thirdparty broker, which possess the entire region's AP identifiers, would handle this problem. For the second problem, we generate noise fingerprint with high similarity to the real fingerprint. Fig.2(d) shows this optimal case when the noise fingerprint (the blue ones) is difficult to distinguish. We use an undigraph to characterize the spatial distribution and the overlapping relations between APs. We first simplify the irregular cover area of the APs to a circular area ( Fig.3(a) ; this simplification does not affect our model's authenticity because it is only for convenience of the display). Then, we can model the APs spatial distribution as an undigraph G(V, E), in which Vertex(V) represents all APs in a region and Edge(E) represents the situation in which two APs in V have an overlapping relation in the spatial distribution. Fig.3(b) illustrates the modeling result of the data shown in Fig.3(a) . We can calculate several complete subgraphs from G. However, the raw graph traversal algorithm is too timeconsuming. To overcome this problem, we propose a faster Complete Subgraph Discovery Algorithm (CSDA). Finally, we further consider the trajectory privacy in which the noiseaddition method will suffer from the homogeneity attack. We protect against this threat by enabling smartphones to generate noise fingerprint with continuous spatial distributions. Our basic idea is to find a complete subgraph adjacent to the previous one as best as we can (Section 4.4).
IV. OUR PROPOSED SCHEMES
We first introduce the noise fingerprint generation algorithm (CSDA) in detail. Then we present the enhanced CSDA (e-CSDA) for the trajectory scenario to defend against the homogeneity attack.
In our system, when a user requests LS in a fixed location, he first uses CSDA to generate several noise sets of APs as the noise fingerprint and then mixes them with the real sensed APs and sends them to the LP. When the user is in the trajectory scenario (e.g., using a navigation LBS), the system will activate the e-CSDA to generate noise fingerprint with continuous spatial distribution to further strengthen privacy protection.
A. CSDA for noise-data generation
The brute-force algorithm for finding a clique in an undigraph is too time-consuming for the LS scenario. Although this brute-force search can be improved by using more efficient algorithms, all of these algorithms require exponential time to solve the problem [22] . This requirement limits the utilization of this technique in our system in cases where G is large.
We solved this issue by dividing the whole problem into two phases. First, we determine the clustering coefficient c of each vertex in G and record the coefficients during the user's idle time (i.e., when the user is not in the LS scenario). As c can describe the closeness of a vertex's neighbors, the neighbors of a vertex with higher c are more likely to constitute a complete subgraph (with the edges between them); when c i = 1, we can be sure that v i and all its neighbors would be perfect candidates for use as noise fingerprint. Based on this feature, in the second phase (LS scenario), we adopt a randomization method to select noise fingerprint near the vertices with very high c (approximately 1). Algorithm 1 describes the details of this method. reselect v i from V h and back to step 4; 8: end if 9: end for
B. e-CSDA for the trajectory scenario
We take into consideration the trajectory privacy in which the attacker (LP) can carry out a homogeneity attack to identify the user's real location.
We enhance the CSDA and use noise fingerprint that possesses the trajectory-like spatial distribution to overcome this problem. Algorithm 2 illustrates this enhancement.
We use the vertex adjacent to the last generated noise fingerprint as the start of our algorithm instead of using randomization every time. In this way, we can generate noise fingerprint neighboring the previous noise fingerprint. This process is rational because, although G does not contain the spatial information of the APs, two adjacent APs in G are very likely to be close to each other in the general case.
V. ANALYSIS

A. Security discussion
We use the number of locations that can be determined using the noise fingerprints as our privacy metric. In our system, the noise-addition method generates high-similarity noises. Thus, ideally, given the privacy metric h, the LP cannot distinguish the real location from the other h locations generated by our noise fingerprint sets, and the probability of a lucky guess is 1 h+1 .
Algorithm 2 enhanced CSDA (e-CSDA) Require:
vertexes of current sensed APs AP real ; noise fingerprint sets from last CSDA or e-CSDA AP 1 noise , · · · , AP h noise ; Ensure:
h new noise fingerprint sets AP 1 noise , · · · , AP h noise ; 1: c j is the cluster coefficient of v j ; 2: n j is the number of v j 's neighbors; 3: n is the number of vertex in AP real ; 4: for each AP i noise (i from 1 to h) do 5: randomly select a vertex v j from AP i noise ; 6: if c j ≥ ϵ and n j ≥ n then 7:
randomly select n vertexes out of v j 's neighbors in G as a noise fingerprint set AP i noise ; 8:
reselect v j from AP i noise and back to step 6; 10:
end if 11: end for However, the LP may perform a distribution attack [2] based on his knowledge of the query probability of each AP in the whole area. This disturbing knowledge will be gradually degraded because of our randomized algorithms for choosing APs. After a period of system implementation, the query probability of each AP will lead to equalization, and the LP will lose this weapon against the user. When in the trajectory scenario, the LP could carry out a homogeneity attack to infer the user's location from a continuous positioning request. In Algorithm 2, we have ensured that the location generated by our noise fingerprint has the same spatial continuity as the real fingerprint. As a result, it is still tricky for the LP to recognize the real trajectory.
VI. EVALUATIONS
LoPEC was evaluated by implementation on a smartphone with the Android 5.0 system, and the associated LP and the broker were realized by simulation on our server. We simulate the MEC location service and the AP information used to calculate the location by the LP was collected from an urban area in the city Harbin China. We considered four aspects of our evaluations.
A. Simulation and implementation
As the fundamental data of our evaluation, we gathered the AP data (Wi-Fi Mac address and signal strength) from the real world by installing a simple program on a smartphone and using it to sense the surrounding Wi-Fi information. Fig.4 shows the area and the coordinates we gathered with Google Earth. Fig. 4 . Area and the coordinates we gathered APs from For each coordinate in Fig.4 , we recorded its geographic coordinate (in the latitude-longitude frame) and the surrounding Wi-Fi Mac addresses with their signal strengths (mean of 10 times for each). To verify the universality of LoPEC, we realized two different positioning technologies, introduced in [23] (RADAR) and [24] (PBL).
We realized and implemented LoPEC on a Samsung smartphone with the Android 5.0 system . LoPEC runs in the background of the OS and protects the user's location privacy when an LS is used.
B. Success rate of clique noise
We evaluated the impact of the following four parameters on the success rate of our CSDA: privacy metric h, clustering coefficient threshold ϵ, the scale of G and different positioning technologies. Fig.5 shows the evaluation results.
The success rate x is independent of the privacy metric h (Fig.5(a) ) because each noise fingerprint is generated independently from the others in CSDA. This feature is inspiring when the user needs to promote his privacy metric. x increases when the clustering coefficient threshold is tightened ( Fig.5(b) ), as higher ϵ means more strict and dense area filtration. In addition, x will increase as G enlarges due to the rise in G's density and clique number ( Fig.5(c) ). Furthermore, we find that x can remain at a high level (85% of RADAR in our experiment) even on the smallest G in our evaluation. This result confirmed that LoPEC could function quite well for various types of users.
The x on RADAR outperforms x on PBL. This result is caused by the differences between these two positioning technologies in their data format requirements. More specifically, RADAR tends to use a fixed number (usually less than 5) of APs to calculate the coordinate; in contrast, PBL will utilize as many APs as it can. This leads to the fact that CSDA always has to generate a larger complete subgraph for PBL than for RADAR, and this will influence x. In general, CSDA can obtain a considerably high success rate in various conditions. Fig.6 shows the effects of h and different scales of G on the CPU time of each algorithm.
C. Computational cost
In Fig.6 , we set the privacy metric h to 4 and select 20 incremental subgraphs from the previous evaluation. The brute-force algorithm takes a considerably longer and very In contrast, the computational costs of our CSDA and e-CSDA are lower by more than an order of magnitude than that of the brute-force algorithm and increase linearly with the size of G.
D. Trajectory feature of noise fingerprint
We evaluated the trajectory feature of the noise fingerprint by performing a positioning experiment. We walked through the area shown in Fig.7 in a casual path (green) and sent a series of RF data, which was protected by our e-CSDA, and we used RADAR to calculate the location of each dataset. Fig.7 shows the result of this evaluation, and we can see clearly that our noise fingerprint (blue) has a trajectory-like spatial distribution, just like the real fingerprint.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes LoPEC, a location privacy-preserving scheme for the MEC scenario. We argue that the preservation of location privacy in MEC is equivalent to the protection of the wireless fingerprint. Based on the good modeling of the AP spatial distribution, we found a way to generate highquality noise fingerprint. We proposed two randomizationbased noise-addition algorithms: CSDA and e-CSDA. CSDA dramatically reduces the computational cost of the raw noise generation method by utilizing the notion of the clustering coefficient and still retains a high success rate. The e-CSDA further protects the location privacy in the trajectory scenario. Evaluation results indicate that LoPEC can protect the user's location privacy in MEC environment.
